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RETHINKING MAC CLAUSES IN THE TIME 




The MAC clause is perhaps the most important clause in contract law, 
giving acquirers the ability to terminate even the largest agreements in the 
face of an often vaguely defined “Material Adverse Change.” For decades, 
even though MAC clauses have been present in nearly every merger 
agreement, courts have almost universally refused to enforce them. But the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s 2018 decision in Akorn may finally change that.
As the world deals with the economic uncertainty caused by COVID-19, courts 
may soon get more opportunities to decide whether or not they will follow 
Akorn’s lead and begin to allow companies to exit agreements. In this Article, 
I argue that they should.
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In any acquisition, lawyers are tasked with creating value, and allocating 
risk and uncertainty is one of the many ways they can do so.1 Perhaps no tool 
at their disposal is as effective at allocating uncertainty as the Material Adverse 
Change (MAC) clause.2 The MAC clause, a mainstay in nearly every modern 
acquisition, allows buyers the option to terminate a deal during the period be-
tween signing and closing in the event of an (often vaguely defined) “material 
adverse change.”3 While the existence of a MAC clause can provide parties 
with the peace of mind to sign a deal, the clause’s capacity to single-handedly 
fell massive transactions has made it the most important clause in contract law 
today.4
1. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & IMAN ANABTAWI, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: A
TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 13-15 (2017) (explaining ways in which lawyers can add value to 
deals).
2. Material Adverse Change (MAC) and Material Adverse Effect (MAE) are often used 
interchangeably to describe these clauses. The definition of the two is close but not identical, so for 
purposes of simplicity, this Article will use MAC to describe both. For a detailed discussion of the 
differences between the two terms, see Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal Usage Analysis of “Material 
Adverse Change” Provisions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 17–20 (2004).
3. NIXON PEABODY LLP, 2017 MAC SURVEY 4–5 (2017), https://www.nixonpeabody.com
/-/media/Files/PDF-Others/mac-survey-2017-nixon-peabody.ashx?la=en. The well-respected survey 
found that some variant of a MAC clause is found in roughly 89% of large acquisition agreements. 
Id. at 5. This Article will assume that the buyer is always the party trying to claim a MAC has oc-
curred (as does most scholarly literature on the subject), even though one study estimated that the 
seller is actually the party asserting that there’s been a MAC up to 21% of the time. See Antonio J. 
Macias, Risk Allocation and Flexibility in Acquisitions: The Economic Impact of Material-Adverse-
Change (MACs) Clauses 56 (Apr. 17, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1108792.
4. Andrew Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the 
Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 824 (2009) (“Beyond the huge sums at 
stake, invocation of a MAC clause in a sensitive corporate acquisition could trigger ‘financial cha-
os’ and a ‘broader systemic crisis’ with ‘significant risks . . . for the financial system as a whole.’ In 
short, the MAC clause is the most important standard clause in contract law today, and a clear and 
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Although MAC clauses have been around for a long time, the Delaware 
Chancery Court’s 2001 decision in IBP5 laid the groundwork for more than a 
decade of consistently seller-friendly rulings.6 In case after case following IBP,
courts refused to find that MACs had occurred, even in the face of circumstanc-
es and changes that might clearly seem “material” to anyone besides the judges 
that ultimately made the decisions.7 During the financial crisis of the late 
2000s, as buyers increasingly faced the prospect of being forced to acquire 
companies whose financial situations had rapidly deteriorated after deals had 
been signed, the IBP precedent often left them with very high legal barriers to 
clear in order to call off their agreements.8 Buyers still were able to leverage 
the threat of MACs to force renegotiated deals with more favorable terms, but 
that threat was tempered by the lack of buyer-friendly court precedent.9
In 2018, however, the Delaware Chancery Court appeared to finally open
the door for a change in tone. Akorn v. Fresenius,10 which was subsequently af-
firmed by the state’s highest court, marked the first time a Delaware court had 
ruled that a MAC had occurred.11 In the wake of Akorn, there is uncertainty 
over how broadly the scope of the court’s ruling should be treated, with some 
contending that the egregious facts of the case make this decision the exception, 
not the rule.12 I argue the opposite, that the court’s reasoning opens the door for 
future rulings to finally treat MAC clauses the way that contract law demands.13
sensible interpretation of the MAC clause is therefore in the public interest.”); see also Michael J. 
de la Merced, Cerberus Kills $1.1 Billion Deal With Innkeepers, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 22, 
2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/cerberus-ends-1-1-billion-innkeepers-deal/ (MAC 
invoked as reason to cancel $1 billion deal); see also Dana Cimilluca & Dennis K. Berman, KKR, 
Goldman Cancel $8 Billion Harman Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2007, at A3 (showing a scenario 
where MAC invoked as reason to cancel $8 billion deal).
5. See IBP, Inc., v. Tyson Foods Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
6. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 827-28.
7. See id. (“[T]he materiality standard has been interpreted by courts to be so demanding 
that—absent a cataclysm of biblical proportions—it cannot be met.”).
8. See generally STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS,
GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 70 (2009).
9. See id.; see also Macias, supra note 3, at 1 (estimating that renegotiations occur before 
closing in 11% of acquisitions). 
10. C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d, 198 A.3d 
724 (Del. 2018).
11. The Ann. Surv. Working Grp. of the M&A Juris. Subcomm., Mergers and Acquisitions 
Comm., ABA, Bus. L. Section, Annual Survey of Judicial Developments Pertaining to Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 74 BUS. LAW. 437, 439 (2019).
12. See Albert H. Manwaring IV, Extraordinary Circumstances MAE Allow a Buyer to 
Break a Bad Deal, MORRIS JAMES DEL. (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.morrisjames.com/pp/article-
1018.pdf (arguing that the court in Akorn is merely applying existing precedent to an egregious set 
of facts and therefore the decision creates no new precedent); but see Richard W. Slack & Joshua 
M. Glasser, The Material Adverse Effect Landscape After Akorn v. Fresenius, 15 PRATT’S JOURNAL 
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 29, 40–44 (2019) (making the case for ways in which Akorn could potential-
ly impact future MAC enforcement).
13. See also Borders v. KLRB, 727 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App. 1987) (“a court cannot . . .
make a new contract for the parties, one they did not make”).
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Although IBP and its successors defined materiality, duration, purpose, and 
foreseeability in ways clearly contrary to the intent of negotiators, Akorn finally 
rights decades of wrongs, giving buyers the contractual remedy that they de-
serve.
Part I of this Article explains how and where MAC clauses are incorporated 
into deals and the various exceptions and carve-outs buyers and sellers haggle 
over. Part II traces the evolution of MAC clauses, discussing how IBP set the 
stage for other seminal cases such as Frontier Oil and Hexion and how the im-
pact of those rulings permeated through mergers and acquisitions law in the late 
2000s and beyond. Part III details the Akorn decision and examines how the 
ruling may finally have opened the door for a more efficient, reasonable, and 
ultimately more buyer-friendly interpretation of MAC clauses. This also re-
quires considering the impact of the Delaware Chancery Court’s recent Boston 
Scientific14 ruling, which, while adverse to Akorn, is ultimately distinguishable.
The Article concludes by examining how COVID-19 and its aftermath will 
force courts to decide how Akorn will be applied, as the virus will likely cause a 
rise in terminated deals and present courts with more MAC claims than they’ve 
seen since the last financial crisis.
I. WHAT IS A MAC?
A. Defining MACs
MAC clauses typically serve two purposes within acquisition agreements.15
First, they are used to establish a qualifying threshold for many of the represen-
tations and warranties made by both parties, reading, for example, that “a target 
has complied with all environmental laws except as would not have a Material 
Adverse Effect.”16 Setting this threshold prevents immaterial discretions and 
discrepancies from being used as a legal basis to threaten a large deal.17
Second, and most notable for the purposes of this article, MAC clauses can 
be used as a more general catch-all for circumstances that would allow a party, 
usually the buyer, to walk away from a deal entirely.18 Given the amount of 
time, energy, and money that goes into most acquisitions, not to mention the 
attention these acquisitions draw from investors and the media, the potential in-
14. Channel Medsystems Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 WL 
6896462 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
15. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 4.
16. Id. Another example of this is the “Weinstein Clause,” which has been added in response 
to the recent #MeToo movement for the purpose of forcing merging companies to disclose any alle-
gations of sexual harassment that may eventually result in a material adverse effect.  See Elizabeth 
C. Tippet, #MeToo Movement Finds an Unlikely Champion in Wall Street With the New “Weinstein 
Clause,” CONVERSATION (Aug. 3, 2018, 6:41 AM). http://theconversation.com/metoo-movement-
finds-an-unlikely-champion-in-wall-street-with-the-new-weinstein-clause-100938.
17. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 4.
18. Id.
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vocation of a MAC clause is no small issue, which is why they are included in 
roughly 90% of deals.19 Even if a MAC is never invoked, its impact is omni-
present as the primary vehicle for fixing the cost-shifting problem present be-
tween buyers and sellers.20 Between signing and closing, sellers still necessari-
ly retain at least some control of their business, even though they no longer have 
a stake in the future performance of the business.21 By forcing sellers to bear 
the cost of any downturn in performance, buyers are given an incentive to make 
sure the business continues to run smoothly until they’ve turned over the keys to 
the acquirer.22
B. Common Exceptions and Carve-Outs
While parties may agree to include a MAC in almost every deal, they rarely 
agree on exactly what that MAC should look like.23 The process of negotiating 
such deals typically involves a tug of war between the opposing parties over 
what exceptions should be included.24 Buyers usually look for the broadest 
possible clause, giving them the legal wiggle room to argue that a MAC has oc-
curred in almost any circumstance.25 Sellers, on the other hand, fight to include 
as many exceptions as possible.26 Examining years of these deals shows that 
some exceptions are present in nearly all MAC clauses, while others are rarely
seen except in the most seller-friendly of MACs.27 One of the most common 
exceptions is for changes in the economy as a whole, which appears in a whop-
ping 85% of deals (and this number rises to 96% in deals valued over one bil-
19. Id. at 6.
20. See id. at 4.
21. See id. In addition to concerns over the operation of the business after signing, there are 
also concerns of information asymmetry before signing. Without a MAC clause and other represen-
tations and warranties, there would be a “lemon problem” as buyers assume sellers are hiding prob-
lems from them that would lead to a lower acquisition price. In this way, MACs create value by 
reducing the need for buyers to discount valuations to account for such information asymmetry. See 
Yair. Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 846, 849 (2002). 
22. Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz wrote an influential 2005 article on this problem, hy-
pothesizing that while risk allocation is a purpose of MAC clauses, sellers should only be held re-
sponsible for material changes that are within their control. The policy purpose of these clauses, 
they say, is to incentivize sellers to make investments that complement a deal’s synergies by giving 
the buyer a credible means of abandoning the deal. While external changes obviously can negatively 
impact a buyer’s investment, it doesn’t serve any policy purpose to use MAC clauses to put the bur-
den of those changes onto sellers. There’s a significant amount of moral hazard that’s created once 
the seller turns from the principal of the business to the agent of the buyer, and MAC enforcement 
can be the vehicle for mitigating this moral hazard. See Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz, Under-
standing MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330 (2005).




27. Id. at 5-6.
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lion dollars).28 Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, there was ram-
pant speculation regarding whether such major calamities could or should im-
pact acquisitions, and MACs began to include exceptions for acts of terrorism.29
Today, clauses exempting such acts, or equivalent changes in political condi-
tions or war, are present in around 80% of agreements.30 Changes in laws or 
regulations are exempted in a similar number of agreements.31 There is specu-
lation that Brexit could trigger a similar discussion with deals involving Eng-
land or Europe, although that effect has yet to become clear.32 In the next dec-
ade it will be worth keeping an eye on whether companies start to include 
exceptions for climate change (and the resulting regulation) as a trigger for 
MACs, as even large companies have started to use the language “material ad-
verse effect” to describe the effects of fossil fuel divestment on their business-
es.33 Other topics that pop up in a majority of agreements include the effects of 
the announcement of the deal (76%), changes in GAAP (80%), and perhaps 
most importantly, the failure by the seller to reach earnings or revenue projec-
tions (67%).34
C. MACs in Practice: A Tool for Renegotiation
Even though sellers may be willing to fight tooth and nail for each addition-
al exclusion, it is possible that all of the time spent hashing out these details is 
for naught. Inconsistent judicial interpretations of MACs have left both buyers 
and sellers uncertain what the result of litigating their claims would be.35 As a 
result, many argue that the primary effect of MACs is seen outside of the court-
28. Id. at 9.
29. See Keri K. Hall, How Big is the MAC?: Material Adverse Change Clauses in Today’s
Acquisition Environment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1088–89 (2003) (giving examples of how 
agreements began to address terrorism in the wake of 9/11).
30. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 10.
31. Id. at 11.
32. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, BREXIT: ISSUES AND Q&A FOR BUSINESSES 10, 16 
(2016), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2016/06/BrexitWhat
DoestheVoteMeanforBusinessFIAFR062816.pdf (advising practitioners on how to approach uncer-
tainty in the wake of Brexit and how MACs could help); see also Travers Smith LLP, Brexit, Force 
Majeure and Material Adverse Change Clauses, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 13 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9e5ee57d-b402-4b78-93ad-09da0cda2094 (analyz-
ing how a recent case could shed light on how courts will interpret MACs triggered by Brexit and 
determining that Brexit will likely be treated the same way that other macroeconomic changes have 
been).
33. Bill McKibben, Money is the Oxygen on Which the Fire of Global Warming Burns, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/money-is-the-oxygen-
on-which-the-fire-of-global-warming-burns.
34. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 13.
35. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2003) (arguing that MACs and other deal protection devices are burdened 
by the uncertainty of not knowing what the result of litigation would be).
Spring 2021] Rethinking Mac Clauses 247
room, as parties are incentivized to settle their claims by simply renegotiating 
the terms of the initial deal.36
There are plenty of instances where renegotiations forced by alleged MACs 
have gone public.37 Perhaps the most notable example was in 2007, when pri-
vate equity giant KKR asserted that a MAC had occurred in its $8 billion buy-
out of stereo maker Harman and announced its intention to cancel the transac-
tion.38 Although neither party could have been sure of how a court would have 
ruled if Harman disputed the MAC and brought the case to trial, the potential 
cost and uncertainty of litigation was enough to incentivize Harman to agree on 
a much smaller investment rather than a buyout.39
Although this was an extreme example of renegotiation, research has indi-
cated that these renegotiations are consistently fruitful for buyers, leading to a 
15% reduction in sale price on average.40 This is clear evidence that MACs do 
affect deals, although it doesn’t show how much of an impact the precise terms 
and exclusions of the clause have.41 Like any type of out-of-court agreement, 
parties are forced to make their own estimates of what going to trial would 
mean, and estimating the trial outcome means estimating the chance of a judge 
or jury determining that a MAC has occurred. Given the friendly precedent, 
sellers have a lot of leeway to argue that they will prevail.42 If that precedent 
36. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Abbott’s Bid to Halt Purchase of Alere, the MAC 
Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/12/07/business/dealbook/abbott-laboratories-alere-mac-clause.html (“Thus a MAC invocation is 
really a renegotiation tool for a lower price.”).
37. See, e.g., Michelle Cortez, Abbott and Alere Agree to Play Nice With $5.3 Billion Deal,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-14/abbott-said-
to-agree-to-buy-alere-at-lower-price-of-51-shr-ft (describing how two companies settled for lower 
purchase price after MAC was asserted); see also Mike Spector & Kris Hudson, Cerberus Calls Off 
Innkeepers Deal, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424053111903327904576524352061142240 (describing deal that was called off after buyer 
asserted that a MAC had occurred); Nick Brown & Jonathan Stempel, Innkeepers Ends Dispute, To 
Sell Hotels for $1 Billion, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
innkeepers/innkeepers-ends-dispute-to-sell-hotels-for-1-billion-idUSTRE79I61E20111019 (describ-
ing the parties reconciling after renegotiating deal at $100 million lower purchase price).
38. Dana Cimilluca & Dennis K. Berman, KKR, Goldman Cancel $8 Billion Harman Deal,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2007, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119040506637935532.
39. See KKR, Goldman Cancel Harman Buy for Lesser Investment, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2007, 
4:40 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/21415054.
40. Macias, supra note 4, at 27.
41. One study argued that the terms don’t affect deals at all, since markets do not react mate-
rially to the announcement of the precise terms of merger deals. See Jeffrey Manns & Robert An-
derson IV, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL. L. REV. 1143, 1175 (2013). However, while 
this might mean that MACs have a muted impact, if this were strictly true, it would be hard to ex-
plain why there have been so many examples of successful renegotiations.
42. In his book on the history of deal-making leading up to the financial crisis, Steven Da-
vidoff discusses MACs in detail and argues that the qualitative, uncertain nature of MAC clauses 
may benefit both buyer and sellers. While the benefits of the existence of the clause for buyers is 
obvious (see, the average 15% decrease in price), Davidoff argues that sellers appreciate that ability 
to argue that there’s a chance that court’s will find in their favor regardless of the gravity of the ad-
verse event. A more quantitative threshold could essentially eliminate renegotiation and allow deals 
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were to flip, however, it is quite possible that we would see that 15% figure
grow much larger.43 As such, even though many disputes are settled out of 
court, how courts (particularly in Delaware) rule when disputes do get adjudi-
cated is still extremely important to dealmakers everywhere.
II. HOW COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED MAC CLAUSES
A. Pre-IBP: Uncertainty
Before IBP, the case law surrounding the enforcement of MACs was incon-
clusive at best, and the lack of court decisions focused solely on interpreting 
MAC clauses left courts with no single case to point to as the gold standard.44
The most cited cases often addressed specific aspects of MACs, focusing on 
deal-specific facts that couldn’t be applied broadly, and no case established an 
effective framework for determining perhaps the most important factor, materi-
ality.45
An early case, Raskin v. Birmingham Steel, was perhaps the closest the Del-
aware courts came to declaring a MAC had occurred prior to the 2018 Akorn
decision.46 In late 1989, Birmingham Steel announced its intent to merge with 
the Harbert Corporation.47 After the merger agreement was reached, Birming-
ham announced that its earnings had declined by more than 50% from the same 
period the year before, sending Harbert shareholders into a frenzy and forcing 
their board to invoke the MAC clause.48 While the parties settled out of court (a 
textbook example of renegotiation forced by the MAC clause) the Delaware 
Chancery Court considered the merits of the case before approving the settle-
to completely implode, which would likely benefit neither side. See DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 62 
(arguing that the qualitative, uncertain nature of MAC clauses may benefit both buyer and sellers).
43. In a novel and compelling article, Y. Carson Zhou makes the case that even before 
Akorn, the Delaware standard for establishing a MAC was actually buyer-friendly because of how 
courts had adjudicated pre-trial motions in MAC cases. He says that the “factual nature of this in-
quiry means that courts are reluctant to reject a buyer’s [MAC] assertion at the summary judgment 
or motion to dismiss stage. This favors the buyer by drawing out litigation, raising costs, and in-
creasing deal uncertainty.” Even if this is true, however, this doesn’t mean that the overall standard 
set by Delaware courts is not seller-friendly, it just helps to provide an explanation of how buyers 
have managed to command 15% price drops during renegotiations. Y. Carson Zhou, Material Ad-
verse Effects as Buyer-Friendly Standard, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 175 (2016).
44. See Sherri L. Toub, “Buyer’s Regret” No Longer: Drafting Effective MAC clauses in a 
Post-IBP Environment, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 849, 871 (2003).
45. See id. at 859.
46. See Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., No. 11365, 1990 WL 193326 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 
1990).
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *2.
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ment agreement and suggested that it would have been possible that even such a 
short-term drop would have been deemed material before IBP.49
In another example of a more buyer-friendly worldview before IBP, the 
Western District of Pennsylvania ruled that a MAC had occurred in the acquisi-
tion of an energy company.50 In this unique case, the merger occurred in the 
shadow of a pending state law meant to deregulate the industry.51 While both 
parties were aware of the coming law, neither was aware of what the impact 
would be, and so they added a MAC clause that came into effect only if one 
party was affected disproportionately to the other.52 When the dust settled, one 
company faced a $1 billion impact, nearly eight times that of the other compa-
ny, which the court ruled to be material.53
The uniqueness of the cases, however, made them the exceptions, not the 
rule. Even before IBP cemented the Delaware position on the issue, courts tend-
ed to lean toward seller-friendly rulings, or no rulings at all.54 In Pine State 
Creamery, a court declined to rule that a MAC had occurred despite an account-
ing error that hid a $400,000 loss over a two month period.55 The court ruled 
that in the absence of a materiality threshold, and given the seasonal nature of 
the business in question (dairy), they could not find a MAC without having a 
clearer picture of what the parties intended when they made the agreement.56
Two other rulings within the same year declined to find a MAC because the 
clause in question did not include any mention of future business prospects and 
the courts declined to read in such an interpretation themselves.57 It would only 
be another year, however, until Delaware would have the opportunity to finally 
sink its teeth into MACs.
49. Id. at *5. (“[T]he record is strong that the financial performance of Birmingham follow-
ing the execution of the merger agreement constituted a material adverse change in financial condi-
tions of Birmingham” although the court allowed that it is possible this might not have been a MAC 
if there was “a full record . . . placed in a larger context”); see Bryan Monson, The Modern MAC: 
Allocating Deal Risk in the Post-IBP v. Tyson World, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, *786 (2015) (assert-
ing that Raskin indicates that even a small short-term decline could satisfy the materiality standard 
prior to IBP).
50. Allegheny Energy v. DQE, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 482, 518 (W.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 216 
F.3d 1075 (3d Cir. 2000).
51. Id. at 485–88.
52. See id. at 490–91.
53. Id. at 518.
54. See Jonathon M. Grech,”Opting Out”—Defining the Material Adverse Change Clause in 
a Volatile Economy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1483, 1514 (2003) (“In the end, then, the court’s “seller-
friendly perspective” is consistent with prior interpretations of similarly broad clauses.”).
55. See generally Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., No, 98-2441, 1999 
WL 1082539 (4th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 5–6.
57. Goodman Mfg. Co. L.P., v. Raytheon Co., No. 98 Civ. 2774 (LAP), 1999 WL 681382 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999); Pacheco v. Cambridge Tech. Partners (Mass.), Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 69 
(D. Mass. 2000).
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B. IBP
In 2001, the Delaware Chancery Court made the ruling that would define 
MAC clauses for the next two decades.58 In 2000, Smithfield, the nation’s larg-
est pork producer, and Tyson, the largest poultry producer, began inquiring 
about the potential of buying IBP, then the largest beef producer and second 
largest pork producer.59 Tyson saw an opportunity to dominate the market, 
viewing an acquisition of IBP as an opportunity “to create the world’s preemi-
nent meat products company.”60 As such, the stakes of the potential transaction 
were high, fundamentally realigning meat distribution in not just America, but 
potentially the world.61
The competition between Smithfield and Tyson escalated into a bidding 
war.62 During this auction process, Tyson was made aware of many flaws with-
in IBP, ranging from inaccurate projections and management shortcomings to 
accounting fraud within one of IBP’s units.63 Despite these red flags, Tyson’s 
eagerness to put a stranglehold on the market led them not to pull back, but ra-
ther to increase their bid by over $4 per share and ultimately sign a merger 
agreement that did little to address these problems.64
The two quarters that followed the signing of the agreement were dismal for 
both Tyson and IBP, in the midst of a severe winter that negatively affected 
both companies.65 Around this time, Tyson began to express doubts about fol-
lowing through with the transaction.66 IBP had given them plenty to worry 
about, with increased SEC interest in the accounting improprieties compound-
ing IBP’s worrisome performance.67 Tyson began to balk at moving forward, 
and eventually notified IBP of their intent to terminate the agreement, asserting 
58. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
59. Id. at 21.




64. Id.  (According to Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion, the merger agreement “permitted 
IBP to recognize unlimited additional liabilities on account of the accounting improprieties . . .
without demanding any representation that IBP meet its projections for future earnings, or any es-




Spring 2021] Rethinking Mac Clauses 251
that a MAC had occurred.68 Litigation ensued, and the Delaware Chancery 
Court heard the case in short order.69
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine’s 64-page opinion offered a fact-intensive dive 
into the mistakes both parties had made in consummating the transaction.
Strine ultimately ruled that a MAC had not occurred and ordered specific per-
formance, chalking up Tyson’s change of heart to buyer’s remorse instead of a 
real material adverse change.70 Strine’s opinion reflected his view that there 
was concerted corporate effort on the part of Tyson to find any excuse to termi-
nate a transaction that no longer looked financially feasible, not because of any 
new material developments, but rather as a result of deficiencies they were al-
ready aware of and had perhaps overlooked in their zeal for becoming the un-
disputed champions of American meat distribution.71
Strine denied Tyson’s first argument, that IBP’s poor first quarter perfor-
mance was itself a MAC, by dismissing those numbers as mere short term con-
cerns.72 Acquirers of companies, he said, can only consider MACs when there 
are changes to the “business or results of operations that [are] consequential to 
the company’s earning power over a commercially reasonable period, which 
one would think would be measured in years rather than months.”73 He referred 
to one quarter of earnings as a mere “blip,”74 and offered that MAC clauses are 
“best read as a backstop protecting the acquirer from the occurrence of un-
known events that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of a tar-
get in a durationally-significant manner.”75 He then elaborated his position that 
the specifics of IBP’s poor quarter did not rise to the level of materiality to be 
qualified as durationally significant.76 He also dismissed Tyson’s concerns 
about accounting improprieties as irrelevant, since they were insignificant in the 
68. Id. at 23 (The merger agreement defined a MAC as follows: Section 5.10 . . . Except as 
set forth in Schedule 5.10 hereto . . . since the Balance Sheet Date . . . there has not been: (a) any 
event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or reasonably 
could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect; (b) other than [limited list of exceptions].). 
IBP, Inc. and Tyson Foods, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger, FindLaw by Thomson Reuters 
[hereinafter Agreement], https://corporate.findlaw.com/contracts/planning/agreement-and-plan-of-
merger-ibp-inc-and-tyson-foods-inc.html, (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
69. Id. at 23.
70. Id. at 65 (“[I]t is useful to be mindful that Tyson’s publicly expressed reasons for termi-
nating the Merger did not include an assertion that IBP had suffered a [MAC].”); Id. at 84 (ordering 
specific performance).
71. Id. at 50–51 (detailing the process by which Tyson finally decided to terminate the 
agreement while making clear that a [MAC] was not considered until after that decision had been 
made).
72. Id. at 67.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 68.
76. See id. at 69–72.
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grand scheme of the deal and Tyson’s upper management made statements that 
showed they believed as such.77
Ultimately, Strine ordered specific performance, forcing the parties, bad 
blood notwithstanding, to complete the merger.78 This decision had obvious 
consequences for the companies involved, but it also would define MAC juris-
prudence for years to come.
C. Post-IBP
1.  An Immediate Shift Toward Seller-Friendliness
Strine’s decision left courts with some answers. It was clear that (1) pru-
dent acquirers should avoid public statements like those made by Tyson’s CEO 
that made it look like the MAC was just being used as a backstop to escape 
buyer’s remorse, and (2) that sellers should seek to make sure their agreements 
were controlled by Delaware Law.79 But IBP still did not give total clarity to 
some big questions, particularly in regards to the acceptable materiality thresh-
old for triggering the new “durational significance” standard.80 As a result, the 
next decade of court cases still lacked consistency, as courts were often left to 
pick and choose specific clauses of Strine’s opinion to justify their result.81 But 
one common thread was clear: Seller-friendly rulings made it nearly impossible 
for buyers to successfully litigate MAC disputes to completion.82 Of course, 
this did not mean that buyers were left out in the cold, since using the threat of a 
77. Id. at 23 (“Don Tyson abandoned the Merger agreement because of poor results in 2001, 
and not because of [the accounting issue].)”; id. at 70 (Strine notes that the part of the company with 
the accounting issue “is but a tiny fraction of IBP’s overall business and that total shut-down of [that 
part] would likely have little effect on the future results of a combined Tyson/IBP.”).
78. Id. at 84.
79. Bradley D. Peters, Material Adverse Change Clauses Following the Tyson Decision, 3
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 19, 22 (2001). Although the Chancery Court decided IBP under 
New York state law, it adopted IBP’s holding under Delaware law in its 2005 decision in Frontier 
Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. CivA. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
80. DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 64.
81. See Robert T. Miller, Cancelling the Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change 
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 130–43 (2009). Professor 
Robert T. Miller asserts that courts did in fact rely on a consistent framework to adjudicate MAC 
claims in the wake of IBP, a system he called the “Earnings Potential Model.” Id. at 100. The model 
suggested that courts compared metrics like EBITDA over relevant fiscal periods to estimate the 
present and future earnings of affected companies and determine whether earnings had declined 
relative to historical standards. Id. These courts, however, had failed to identify precisely which 
fiscal periods should be compared and what threshold of materiality should be used over those peri-
ods. Id. In his article, Miller suggests a new model, which he calls the Continuing Profitability 
Model, using a more complicated system of discounted cash flow to determine whether or not an 
acquirer’s equity is now less than it was at purchase. Id. at 101. If so, there has been a MAC. Id. at 
101–02.  
82. DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 64.
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MAC to try to renegotiate more favorable terms would, at worst, lead to them 
simply going forward with a deal they had already agreed to.83
But IBP was not the only development that favored sellers. The mid-2000s 
saw an increase in the number of exclusions that sellers were including in MAC 
clauses, further limiting the grounds the buyers could use to assert a MAC.84
Courts seemed to endorse this trend, rejecting claims that might previously have 
fallen within the ambit of broad MACs by essentially implying exclusions into 
MACs for specific claims. In Great Lakes Chemical v. Pharmacia, the Chan-
cery Court said that it was incumbent on dealmakers to include language in 
MACs specifying whether the clause covers both internal and external changes 
if they want to guarantee that the court will consider both.85 In S.C. Johnson & 
Son v. Dowbrands, a federal court in Delaware rejected a MAC claim on the 
basis that pending litigation could not be used as the grounds for a MAC in the 
absence of a specific provision including such a claim within the reach of the 
MAC.86 Overall, courts were making it clear that there was a “substantial bur-
den on a remorseful buyer attempting to prove a MAC.”87
2.  Hexion v. Huntsman
Perhaps the most important of the post-IBP cases was a 2007 Delaware 
Chancery Court ruling in Hexion v. Huntsman.88 In early 2007, Hexion, a large 
manufacturer of chemical products, sought to purchase Huntsman, another 
chemical manufacturer.89 After the merger agreement was signed, closing was 
delayed until the following year as the parties awaited regulatory clearance.90
In that time, Hexion began to get cold feet, worried that the prospective com-
bined entity might be insolvent.91 Hexion initiated litigation, alleging that 
Huntsman’s poor earnings reports since the signing of the initial agreement con-
stituted a MAC.92
83. Id. at 65.
84. Id. at 66.
85. See Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788 A.2d 544, 556 (Del. Ch. 2001) 
(stating that the interpretation that the agreement is only meant to encompass external changes “may 
ultimately prevail on a developed factual record” but that “had the parties intended to exclude from 
the provision’s scope all external events that materially affect the Company’s business, they could 
have included such an express limitation in their Agreement”). For more information on the differ-
ences between internal and external changes, see Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 22.
86. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. DowBrands, Inc.,167 F. Supp. 2d 657, 670–71 (D. Del. 
2001) (“The sole decision by a third party to bring a lawsuit does not bring about any change in the 
company’s assets . . . the Court concludes that the [litigation] does not constitute a basis for SCJ’s
claim that DowBrands breached . . . the Agreement.”).
87. DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 64.
88. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008).
89. Id. at 720–21.
90. Id. at 721.
91. Id.
92. Id. 721–22.
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The court sided with Huntsman, citing IBP’s language in its finding that a 
MAC had not occurred.93 While Huntsman’s performance had declined, it had 
only suffered a 3% hit to its EBITDA from 2006 to 2007, and management only 
expected a 7% decline from 2007 to 2008.94 Despite Hexion’s projections that 
the following year would bring far greater declines that would greatly hamper 
Huntsman’s future profitability, the court rejected these forecasts as “overly 
pessimistic.95 The court cited several macroeconomic challenges faced by 
Huntsman (seemingly excluding external changes from the MAC definition) 
before stating “[u]ltimately, the burden is on Hexion to demonstrate the exist-
ence of [a MAC] in order to negate its obligation to close, and that is a burden it 
cannot meet here.”96
While Vice Chancellor Lamb’s ruling directly applied IBP’s reasoning to 
new facts (with the same result), it is important to note that he did so without 
even diving into the exclusions that attorneys had included in the original 
deal.97 Instead, he rejected Hexion’s argument by stating that a MAC had not 
occurred under the broad definition one would ascribe to the most general MAC 
clause.98 This signaled the court’s intention to set a high bar for MAC claims, a 
bar that became particularly important as America entered the financial crisis.99
3.  The Financial Crisis
While Hexion’s claim may have been the most notable MAC to be litigated, 
it was far from the only dispute in the late 2000s. Buyers began to threaten (and 
follow through on) MAC claims, particularly in lending industries that were 
most affected by the financial crisis.100 In 2007, Accredited Home Lenders, a 
leading subprime mortgage lender, began to feel the effects of the slowing hous-
ing market as more and more borrowers began to default on loans that they per-
haps never should have received.101 Bear Stearns, Accredited’s (now defunct) 
investment banker, sought a buyer to provide Accredited with much-needed 
93. Id. at 738 (“The important consideration therefore is whether there has been an adverse 
change in the target’s business that is consequential to the company’s long-term earnings power 
over a commercially reasonable period, which one would expect to be measured in years rather than 
months.”).
94. Id. at 742.
95. Id. at 743 (“While the court recognizes that management’s expectations for a company’s
business often skew towards the overly optimistic, especially in the presence of litigation, the court 
ultimately concludes that Hexion’s projections reflect an overly pessimistic view of Huntsman’s
future earnings.”).
96. Id. at 743 (citing crude oil and natural gas prices and an unfavorable exchange rate as 
macroeconomic challenges).
97. DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 73.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 66–73 (detailing the “MAC Wars” of 2007).
101. Id. at 49-50.
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capital to avoid bankruptcy, and an auction ensued.102 The eventual winner was 
Lone Star Funds, which commenced a tender offer on June 1, 2007.103
Just two months later, it became clear that the mortgage market had contin-
ued to deteriorate at a rate that neither party had contemplated.104 After Accred-
ited’s independent auditors adjusted their projected third quarter losses from 
$64 million to $230 million, Lone Star indicated that a MAC had occurred, and 
thus they could not go through with the deal.105 Accredited filed suit in Dela-
ware.106 Only a month later, the parties announced they had renegotiated their 
original deal for $3.35 per share less than the original offer, a 22% decrease.107
A similar result was achieved in the buyout of Sallie Mae by a consortium 
led by J.C. Flowers, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase.108 Even though 
the financial crisis made it more likely than ever that businesses could com-
pletely combust, rather than just showing an earnings hiccup, companies con-
tinued to renegotiate deals rather than canceling them or bringing them all the 
way to trial. Approximately five to ten MAC claims were made public in the 
year after the Accredited lawsuit, and only two made it to the trial level.109
What we may never know is how this would have been different had the 
courts made it easier for those asserting MACs to successfully follow through 
with their claims. It’s likely that a similar number of claims would settle out of 
court, given the incentives present in the legal system to do so, but it is hard to 
imagine that sellers would continue to get such favorable settlements.110 One 
factor potentially working in favor of the sellers was intertwined with the reality 
of the mergers and acquisitions business around that time. As private equity 
firms began to dominate the industry, they sought to use the MAC as reputa-
tional cover for getting out of bad deals.111 This reputational cover was espe-
cially important for them due to their status as repeat players in the industry, 
102. Id. at 50-51.
103. Id. at 51.
104. Id. at 51-52.
105. Id. at 52-53.
106. Id. at 52.
107. See id. at 69. 
108. See id. at 68-70 (however, the deal was later cancelled on other grounds).
109. Id. at 73.  Aside from Hexion, only one other major case was ultimately decided by liti-
gation. See Genesco v. Finish Line, No. 07-2137-II(III), 2007 Tenn. Ch. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 
27, 2007).  That case involved two shoe retailers and was decided in a Tennessee court, under Ten-
nessee law.  Because of the unique venue and governing law, it had little precedential impact on 
other MAC cases.  Id. at 71.  For further analysis of the Genesco v. Finish Line litigation, see Brad-
ley C. Sagraves & Bobek Talebian, “Material Adverse Change Clauses in Tennessee: Genesco v. 
Finish Line,” 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 343 (2008).
110. See Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better Than Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html (detailing how settling is 
consistently a prudent move over going to trial, regardless of the expected outcome of litigation).
111. See DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 106 (discussing methods private equity firms used to get 
out of bad deals); see also Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV 
481 (2009) (discussing private equity firms’ failures and attempts to cover themselves.).
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and a possible reason that courts were reticent to make rulings that MACs had 
occurred.112 Regardless of any pretextual readings of judicial intent, even after 
the financial crisis faded away, it would be almost a decade before MAC juris-
prudence would be challenged again in a big way.
III. HOW AKORN V. FRESENIUS MAY CHANGE EVERYTHING
A. The Background: Akorn v. Fresenius
1.  The Facts
In mid-2017, Fresenius, a German pharmaceutical company, signed an 
agreement and plan of merger with Akorn, an American pharmaceutical com-
pany.113 Under the plan, each share of Akorn common stock would be convert-
ed into the right to receive $34 per share, which would have made the deal 
worth almost $5 billion.114 Just one year later, however, Fresenius convinced a 
Delaware court to let it do what no acquirer had done in the state before: Walk 
away from a deal on the grounds that a MAC had occurred.115
The merger plan conditioned closing on three stipulations.116 First, Akorn’s 
representations must be true and correct, except where failure to be true and 
correct would not be reasonably expected to constitute a contractually defined
MAC.117 Second, Akorn must comply in all material respects with its obliga-
tions under the Merger Agreement.118 Third, Akorn must not suffer a MAC.119
Combined, these three factors made the qualifiers on the representations and 
warranties of the agreement very similar to those found in similar cases (such as 
IBP or Hexion) in which the court had ruled that there was no MAC.
Immediately after the agreement was signed, Akorn’s business began to 
show a sharp decline.120 Despite Akorn’s official assurances at signing that its 
full year projections remained valid, the second quarter results showed another 
sharp drop in performance.121 Akorn attributed the decline to “increased com-
112. See DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 106.
113. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *1, *4, *5 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).
114. Id. at 1; see also Tom Hals, Delaware judge says Fresenius can walk away from $4.8 
billion Akorn deal, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-akorn-m-a-
fresenius-ruling/delaware-judge-says-fresenius-can-walk-away-from-4-8-billion-akorn-deal-
idUSKCN1MB2PY.
115. See Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 439.
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petition and the loss of a key contract,” but told Fresenius that “the downturn 
was temporary.”122 But another quarter of bad results was complemented by 
two disastrous reports, one from an anonymous whistleblower who alleged that 
Akorn’s product development process was falling short of regulatory require-
ments and a second letter with “equally disturbing allegations about Akorn’s 
quality compliance programs.”123 This prompted Fresenius to initiate its own 
investigation, which turned up “serious and pervasive data integrity prob-
lems.”124 Further tension between the two parties arose as Akorn made a poor 
showing in front of the FDA, its primary regulator, and Akorn’s business per-
formance continued to decline.125
On April 22, 2018, Fresenius gave notice that it was terminating the Merger 
Agreement on the basis of the three closing conditions being violated.126 In 
other words, Fresenius was asserting a MAC.127 Akorn immediately filed suit, 
setting the stage for the Chancery Court to once again weigh in on MAC claus-
es.128
122. Id. at *1–2.
123. Id. at *2. 
124. Id.
125. Id. (Vice Chancellor Laster characterized the presentation as “not fully transparent” and 
“misleading.”).
126. Id. (“Fresenius asserted that Akorn’s representations regarding regulatory compliance 
were so incorrect that the deviation would reasonably be expected to result in a Material Adverse 
Effect. Fresenius also cited Akorn’s failure to comply in all material respects with its contractual 
obligations under the Merger Agreement, including Akorn’s obligation to use commercially reason-
able efforts to operate in the ordinary course of business in all material respects. Fresenius also cited 
the section in the Merger Agreement that conditioned Fresenius’s obligation to close on Akorn not 
have suffered a Material Adverse Effect.”).
127. Akorn, Inc., Fresenius Kabi AG, Fresenius SE & Co. KGAA, Quercus Acquisition, Inc., 
Agreement and Plan of Merger, SEC ARCHIVES (April 24, 2017), https://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/3116/000095015717000499/ex2-1.htm. (The merger agreement defined a 
MAC as follows: “Section 3.06. Absence of Certain Changes. Since the Balance Sheet Date through 
the date of this Agreement . . . (b) there has not been any Material Adverse Effect or any effect, 
change, event or occurrence that would, individually or in the aggregate, reasonably be expected to 
have a Material Adverse Effect . . . . Section 8.12. “Material Adverse Effect” means any effect, 
change, event or occurrence that, individually or in the aggregate (i) would prevent or materially 
delay, interfere with, impair or hinder the consummate of the Transactions or the compliance by the 
company with its obligation under this Agreement or (ii) has a material adverse effect on the busi-
ness, results of operations or financial condition of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a 
whole; provided, however, that none of the following, and no effect, change, event or occurrence 
arising out of, or resulting from, the following, shall constitute or be taken into account in determin-
ing or whether a Material Adverse Effect has occurred, is continuing or would reasonably be ex-
pected to occur: [long list of specific and economy-wide exceptions].” It’s worth noting that this list 
of exceptions is far more extensive than the list accompanying the IBP and Tyson agreement cited 
in note 69.).
128. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *3.
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2.  The Holding
In his lengthy opinion, Vice Chancellor Laster ruled that Fresenius had suf-
fered a MAC.129 He said that the MAC condition in the agreement was “com-
mon,” starting with a general statement and then carving out “certain types of 
events that otherwise could give rise” to a MAC.130 Laster ruled that no carve 
out in the contract could be read to place “business risk” onto Fresenius, leaving 
the question of whether or not the deviation in the company’s business perfor-
mance was material.131 He made it clear that he was abiding by IBP’s defini-
tion of materiality, saying that the effect must “substantially threaten the overall 
earnings potential of a target in a durationally-significant manner.”132 He also 
followed Hexion, evaluating the magnitude of Akorn’s decline by comparing 
the company’s performance against its results in the same quarter the prior 
year.133 While he cited previous precedent and scholarship that suggested mate-
riality thresholds, he noted that he did not consider these binding and that the 
ultimate inquiry is fact-specific.134
In this case, he noted that Akorn’s EBITDA declined by 86% on a year-
over-year basis (51% adjusted), a “departure from its historical trend.”135 He 
noted that he believed this decline to be durationally significant since it had al-
ready persisted for a year with no sign of reversing and could be attributed to
similarly long-lasting factors such as new market entrants and the loss of a con-
tract that was vital to growth projections.136 He also considered valuations by 
analysts that projected a drop in EBITDA of more than a 60% for the coming 
year, more than five times the downturn expected across the industry as a 
whole.137 He also rejected Akorn’s argument that there could not be a MAC as 
long as Fresenius was still making a profit on the deal, explicitly invoking the 
frustration doctrine (which is discussed at length later in this Article).138 Laster 
concludes his MAC analysis clearly and succinctly: “The record in this case es-
tablished the existence of a sustained decline in business performance that is 
durationally significant and which would be material to a reasonable buyer. 
Akorn suffered a [MAC].”139
129. Id. at *47.
130. Id. at *51.
131. Id. at 52.
132. Id. at 53 (quoting In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (“These precedents do not foreclose the possibility that a buyer could show that per-
centage changes of a lesser magnitude constituted [a MAC]. Nor does it exclude the possibility that 
a buyer might fail to prove that percentage changes of a greater magnitude constituted [a MAC]”).
135. Id. at *55.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *56.
138. Id. at *57; see infra Part III.B for a discussion of the frustration doctrine.
139. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *57. It’s also worth noting that one of the other issues ad-
dressed in the holding was whether Akorn had breached the Ordinary Course Covenant, which re-
quired that Akorn use “commercially reasonable efforts to operate in the ordinary course of business 
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3.  The Aftermath
The immediate reaction to Vice Chancellor Laster’s decision and the Su-
preme Court’s subsequent affirmation was that neither would have any mean-
ingful impact on MAC jurisprudence, since the courts were simply faced with a 
unique set of glaring facts.140 As Laster said:
In prior cases, this court has correctly criticized buyers who agreed to acquisitions, 
only to have second thoughts after cyclical trends or industrywide effects negative-
ly impacted their own businesses, and who then filed litigation in an effort to es-
cape their agreements without consulting with the sellers. In these cases, the buyers 
claimed that the sellers had suffered contractually defined material adverse effects 
under circumstances where the buyers themselves did not seem to believe their as-
sertions.
This case is markedly different. Fresenius responded to a dramatic, unex-
pected, and company-specific downturn in Akorn’s business that began in the quar-
ter after signing . . . . Any second thoughts that Fresenius had about the Merger 
Agreement were justified by unexpected events at Akorn.
141
But even though Laster did not indicate that this ruling was meant to change 
the standard set for MACs, what if the ruling was about more than just egre-
gious facts? What if Laster meant to indicate that it was finally time for courts 
to move past the IBP framework for adjudicating MAC claims? At the very 
least, a compelling argument can be made that Laster’s ruling gives courts the 
leeway to start to make more permissive MAC rulings in the future.
B. The Frustration Doctrine and How IBP Ignores Contract Law
In 2009, University of Colorado School of Law Professor Andrew Schwartz 
published an article that used a conceptual tool he called a “standard clause 
analysis” to interpret MAC clauses and argue that based on his analysis, MACs 
were being consistently misapplied by courts and practitioners.142 While his 
analysis is markedly different than the reasoning that had been used by courts 
before and after its publication, I argue Akorn both explicitly and implicitly 
in all material respects” before closing. Id. at 88. Laster concluded that they had breached the cove-
nant, using many of the same reasons that had impacted the MAC decision. Id. One analysis pointed 
out that this finding was notable because Laster appeared to use a much lower threshold for breach 
than he used for the MAC analysis. Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 447. Since ordinary course 
covenants are common in merger agreements, it also pointed out that this reasoning could be used 
by buyers in the future to avoid the need for even asserting a MAC.  Id.  However, it also observed 
that the Delaware Supreme Court expressly refrained from commenting on that portion of the opin-
ion. Id. “[W]e also do not address whether. . . Akorn breached the Ordinary Course Covenant”).
140. Manwaring, supra note 12 (“While this is the first time the Court of Chancery has per-
mitted a buyer to terminate a merger agreement based on a ‘material adverse effect’ on the seller’s
business, the Akorn decision simply represents an application of Delaware’s policy of freedom of 
contract to an egregious set of facts.”).
141. See Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at 3–4.
142. Schwartz, supra note 4.
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adopts his reasoning for the first time, providing a framework for future courts 
to follow.
Schwartz begins by explaining one the core tenets of contract law, default 
terms, which apply in the absence of an explicit term addressing a particular 
matter.143 Contracting parties are free to add their own, specific, custom lan-
guage to account for their personal preferences or more complex situations, but 
if they do not add language that addresses any given default terms, courts use 
the default terms as gap-fillers.144 Over time, lawyers developed “standard 
clauses” as a happy medium between the simple, untailored default terms and 
the time-consuming, complex custom terms that lawyers can add.145 Schwartz 
points to the impracticability doctrine as an example of this framework.146 The 
default term for impracticability dictates that a party to a contract may be ex-
cused from performance of the contract if changed circumstances render per-
formance impossible or exceedingly difficult.147 Contracting parties may add 
any terms they choose to cover impracticability, but if the parties don’t add any-
thing, then courts will likely choose to assume the parties intended to incorpo-
rate the default term definition of impracticability.148 However, modern con-
tracts commonly include a Force Majeure clause, which addresses the same 
issues that the default term would, but expressly creates its own definition of 
impracticability.149 Force Majeure clauses are thus the “standard clause analog” 
for impracticability.150
Schwartz then describes the doctrine that is relevant for our purposes: frus-
tration.151 The frustration doctrine closely parallels that of impracticability, but 
instead of excusing performance that has become impossible, it excuses perfor-
mance that has become worthless.152 To show the frustration doctrine in prac-
tice, and distinguish it from impracticability, Schwartz uses the example of an 
143. Id. at 794.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 796 (defining “standard clause” and asserting that “Standard clauses are there-
fore an efficient way to obtain an individualized agreement at modest cost.”).
146. Id. at 801.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. An example from a contracts textbook of a Force Majeure clause: “If any party fails to 
perform its obligations because of strikes, lockouts, . . . [list of situations] . . . or other causes be-
yond the reasonable control of the party obligated to perform, then that party’s performance shall be 
excused for so long as the cause for failure to perform persists.” GEORGE W. KUNEY & ROBERT M.
LLOYD, CONTRACTS: TRANSACTIONS AND LITIGATION 815 (4th Ed. 2017). 
150. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 801.
151. Id. at 802.
152. Id. (“Where, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrat-
ed without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assump-
tion on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, 
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. L. INST. 1981).)).
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early twentieth century British case.153 In 1902, the owner of an apartment 
along a famous London street agreed to rent out the space during the coronation 
of King Edward VII.154 After the coronation was postponed due to the future 
king falling ill, the would be tenant refused to pay for the apartment, arguing 
that the purpose of the contract (viewing the coronation) had been frustrated, a 
viewpoint that a court eventually agreed with.155 This marked the creation of 
frustration doctrine, and it became a default rule of contract law in both England 
and America.156
Keeping with his hypothesis that all default rules must have a standard 
clause that allows them to be modified within the context of specific contracts, 
Schwartz uses the four elements of frustration to predict what such a standard 
clause would look like in a modern contract.157 In order to “be excused under 
the frustration doctrine, part[ies] must first show that [their] ‘principal purpose’ 
in making the contract was frustrated by an unexpected change in circumstanc-
es.”158 This principle purpose “must be so completely the basis of the contract 
that . . . without it the transaction would make little sense.”159 Since this is the 
default frustration term, a standard clause could modify this term by broadening 
the number of purposes that could be frustrated.160 Next, frustration mandates 
that the stated purpose must be “totally or nearly” frustrated.161 A standard 
clause could lower this bar, using terms like “material” or “considerably” in-
stead of “totally.”162 Next, frustration requires an “extraordinary event,” a 
standard similar to the previous two elements, but adds a requirement of unfore-
seeability.163 While Schwartz points out that unforeseeability is relevant, but 
not dispositive, in applying the frustration doctrine, a standard clause could ei-
ther expressly state the events or types of events that it encompasses, or could 
eliminate the requirement entirely.164 Lastly, frustration requires that the trig-
153. Id. (citing Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.)).
154. Id. at 803.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing the adoption of the doctrine in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTS. § 288 (1932) 
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 265 (AM. L. INST. 1981) as proof of its acceptance).
157. Id. at 805–12.
158. Id. at 805.
159. Id. at 805–06 quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. L. INST.
1981).
160. Id. at 806.
161. Id. (“Mere unprofitability or even significant losses are insufficient. Rather, a party’s
contractual objectives must have been completely thwarted by the changed conditions such that the 
other party’s performance is rendered worthless. Nothing short of a cataclysm or catastrophe will 
satisfy this element.”).
162. Id. at 807 (Schwartz points out that whatever term is used, it must set a higher bar than 
“slightly,” as such a low threshold could potentially be ruled unenforceable due to a lack of consid-
eration.).
163. Id. at 808–09.
164. Id. at 809–10.
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gering event be exogenous, out of control of the contracting parties.165 Similar 
to the last element, a standard clause could either expressly state the types of 
exogenous events that would trigger it, or eliminate the term altogether.166
Keeping these elements in mind, Schwartz describes several examples of 
such standard clauses that are commonly used in their respective industries, in-
cluding the Morals clause in celebrity endorsements167 and the Walkaway 
clause in vehicle financing agreements.168 But most importantly, he cites the 
MAC clause as an example of a standard clause analog of the frustration doc-
trine at work in “the most economically significant private contracts on 
earth.”169
Schwartz posits that MAC clauses alter the common law definition of frus-
tration in several ways. Most notably, they employ “the term ‘material,’ there-
by establishing a standard lower than the ‘total’ or ‘complete’ loss of value that 
the common law would ordinarily demand.”170 Additionally, MAC carve-outs 
serve to closely define what kind of events, foreseeable or otherwise, qualify as 
frustrating the relevant purpose.171 Thus, the MAC clause is perhaps the closest 
clause “to being a generic standard clause analog of the frustration doctrine” 
that exists today.172 Schwartz, however, is dismayed by what he sees as a fail-
ure by courts “to recognize the MAC clause’s relationship with the frustration 
doctrine.”173 Case law, he says, “has viewed the MAC clause as ‘sui generis’ 
and has attempted to interpret it in a vacuum, yielding a muddled and unclear 
interpretation.”174 He argues that his analysis, which treats the MAC clause as a 
customization of the elements of the default rule, “provides at least three key 
insights” regarding how courts should have been interpreting MAC clauses all 
along.175
165. Id. at 811–12.
166. Id. at 812.
167. Id. at 812–15 (giving examples of misbehaving celebrities who rendered endorsement 
deals useless by potentially tarnishing the reputation of the company that was paying for them to be 
the face of their product, most notably football star Michael Vick, whose involvement and eventual 
incarceration for his role in a dogfighting ring left his agreement with Nike of no use to the sports 
apparel giant).
168. Id. at 816 (focusing on the Hyundai Assurance program, later copied by many competi-
tors, which “allows the buyer to stop making payments and return the vehicle ‘in case of certain 
life-altering circumstances’ that render the car much less valuable than expected, such as unem-
ployment or the loss of a driver’s license. All these events must be exogenous—unemployment 
must be involuntary; the loss of one’s license must not have been due to drunk driving.”).
169. Id. at 817.
170. Id. at 822.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 823.
173. Id. at 825.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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At the time Schwartz published his article, the Delaware Chancery Court 
had yet to find that a MAC had occurred in even a single case.176 While law 
review articles are influential, they are not binding on courts, and so while fu-
ture judges may have found Schwartz’s analysis persuasive, many of his claims 
may have fallen on deaf ears due to the lack of strong case law precedent for 
him to cite to.177 After Akorn, however, that may change. In the next section, I 
describe how each of Schwartz’s insights into viewing MAC clauses as a frus-
tration clause analog provides a clearer set of guidelines for interpreting them, 
and how Akorn may finally have provided the long-awaited judicial precedent 
to back up his theory.
1.  Materiality
The meaning of “material” has been the most contentious point raised over 
and over again in the court cases that have dealt with MACs.178 Just as no Del-
aware case before Akorn found that a MAC had occurred, no judicial opinion 
settled on a firm definition of what materiality threshold is appropriate for these 
cases either. Contract law has long defined material breaches as those that “de-
prive the injured party of the benefit that it justifiably expected,” while securi-
ties laws have defined materiality as “important to the reasonable sharehold-
er.”179 Vice Chancellor Strine’s seminal IBP opinion importantly defined mate-
materiality as changes that “substantially threaten the overall earnings potential 
of the target in a durationally-significant manner,”180 and the Hexion opinion 
suggested that a “heavy burden” was carried by anyone trying to enforce in a 
MAC.181 While the language of these two cases has been routinely adopted in 
subsequent decisions, the lack of positive MAC verdicts shows that the “materi-
176. Id. at 791. I’d be remiss to ignore Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritas) Hold-
ings Pvt. Lt., No. 8980-VCG, 2014 WL 5654305 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2014), where the Chancery 
Court seemed to indicate they were leaning towards ruling that MAC had occurred, but ultimately 
decided to leave the issue unaddressed and determined the case on other grounds. Y. Carson Zhou 
notes that “The court focused even more heavily on the contractual text than in IBP or Hexion, and 
(buyer-friendly) decision turned on deciphering the complex interaction between contractual provi-
sions.” Zhou, supra note 43, at 183. Unfortunately, because the court did not ultimately address the 
MAC clause directly, it offers little direct support for Schwartz (or Akorn).
177. THE WRITING CTR AT GEORGETOWN UNIV. L. CTR., WHEN AND HOW TO USE 
SECONDARY SOURCES AND PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY TO RESEARCH AND WRITE LEGAL 
DOCUMENTS (2014) (explaining that primary sources, such as case law, can be mandatory, binding 
authority, while secondary sources, such as law review articles, can only be persuasive authority).
178. See, e.g., Allegheny Energy v. DQE, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 482, 517 (W.D. Pa. 1999), 
aff’d, 216 F.3d 1075 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Although there is a common understanding of what the term 
‘material’ encompasses, the inherent relatively of this word makes it ambiguous in the absence of 
any qualifying language”), Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., No. 98-2441,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 31529, at *16 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is simply a question of degree regarding 
the point that Pine State’s operating losses would become ‘material’”).
179. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 826.
180. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
181. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008).
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ality standard has been interpreted by courts to be so demanding that—absent a 
cataclysm of biblical proportions—it cannot be met.”182
This “catastrophe” standard is a perfect example of what Schwartz sees as 
the disconnect between how standard clauses should be applied and how courts 
have enforced MACs.183 The frustration doctrine already allows buyers to es-
cape deals if the company they are acquiring experiences a catastrophe.184
Reading the same threshold into MAC clauses, clauses that lawyers “expend 
considerable resources drafting and negotiating,” treats the MAC clause the 
same as the default rule.185 “This interpretation does violence to the founda-
tional principles of freedom of contract and to the interpretive rule that a con-
tract should be read so as not to render any term meaningless.”186 “Instead, 
courts should recognize that the MAC clause, as a standard clause analog of the 
frustration doctrine, is intended to contract around—not reiterate—that doc-
trine.”187
Schwartz’s prescription for fixing this misconception is twofold. First, he 
suggests lowering the MAC threshold (maybe “severe” or “devastating” rather 
than “catastrophic”).188 Second, he recommends doing away with IBP’s “dura-
tional significance” requirement, recognizing that (1) “even a short-term loss or 
other problem can have long-term consequences for the value of a business as a 
going concern” and (2) “the typical MAC clause says nothing about dura-
tion.”189
It’s in this department where Akorn first appears as the knight in shining 
armor. Vice Chancellor Laster begins his analysis typically, citing the IBP and 
Hexion language.190 Then, he cites an article and a case that each cited a possi-
ble materiality threshold (40% and 50%) before saying that these “precedents 
do not foreclose the possibility that a buyer could show that percentage changes 
of a lesser magnitude constituted [a MAC]. Nor does it exclude the possibility 
that a buyer might fail to prove that percentage changes of a greater magnitude 
182. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 827-28.  Schwartz points to a Texas case as perhaps the most 
glaring example of this “impossibly high” benchmark. Borders v. KRLB, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 357 
(Tex. App. 1987) (holding that even though an acquired radio station lost half of its listeners be-
tween signing and closing, the court ruled that the station had not “lost its ability to function as a 
business entity” and thus the materiality threshold was not breached.).  
183. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 828.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. See also Hexion, 965 A.2d (“It is a maxim of contract law that, given ambiguity be-
tween potentially conflicting terms, a contract should be read so as not to render any term meaning-
less.”).
187. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 828.
188. Id. at 829.
189. Id. at 830. I disagree with his first argument here, since “durationally-significant” could 
easily be construed to encompass short-term losses with far-reaching impacts, but I agree with his 
second argument for why even durational significance is not an appropriate standard.
190. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *53 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018).
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constituted” a MAC.191 Next, he does what seemingly no major court decision 
had done in the previous decade, directly invoking Schwartz’s analysis:
More broadly, the black letter doctrine of frustration of purpose already oper-
ates to discharge a contracting party’s obligation when his “principal purpose is 
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.” 
This common law doctrine . . . (restates Schwartz). In lieu of the default rule that 
performance may be excused only where a contract’s principal purpose is com-
pletely or nearly completely frustrated, a contract could “lower this bar to an 
achievable level by providing for excuse when the value of counterperformance has 
‘materially’ (or ‘considerably’ or ‘significantly’) diminished.” That is what the par-
ties did in this case. It should not be necessary for Fresenius to show a loss on the 
deal before it can rely on the contractual exit right it negotiated.
192
Laster uses the frustration clause analysis to discredit Akorn’s contention 
that no MAC had occurred unless the circumstances had changed so much that 
Fresenius stood to make zero profit from the transaction.193 Finding a MAC 
had occurred in a transaction in which the acquirer still stood to make a profit 
marked a clear departure from the “catastrophe” requirement of materiality.
Some may argue that given the high drop in past and projected EBITDA, these 
were a severe set of facts that the court was faced with.194 But nevertheless, I 
find it impossible to argue that any deal in which the acquirer stands to profit 
constitutes the “total” or “complete” loss of value that Schwartz found that pre-
vious courts had required.195 While Laster doesn’t set a defined lower material-
ity threshold, he at least acknowledges that the appropriate definition of materi-
ality departs from the common law and recognizes that the existence of MAC 
clauses demands a lower threshold.196
191. Id.  The case Laster cites is Raskin v. Birmingham, No. 11365, 1990 WL 193326, at *5 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990). The article he cites observes that most (non-Delaware) courts have recog-
nized the materiality threshold as being breached once profits decrease by at least 40%. Lou. R. 
Kling & Eileen T. Nugent, Negotiated Acquisitions of Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions
§ 11.04[9], at 11–66 (2018 ed.).
192. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *57.
193. Id. at *56.
194. E.g., Manwaring, supra note 12 (“[T]he Akorn decision simply represents an applica-
tion of Delaware’s policy of freedom of contract to an egregious set of facts”).
195. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 827-28 (“[T]he materiality standard has been interpreted 
by courts to be so demanding that—absent a cataclysm of biblical proportions—it cannot be met”).
196. Richard W. Slack & Joshua M. Glasser argue that Laster did actually try to create some 
guidance for what an objective materiality threshold would be. They argue that Laster’s reference to 
Kling and Nugent’s 40% threshold was an endorsement (if lukewarm) for using such a threshold for 
drops in financial performance that would trigger a general MAC. They also argue that Laster sets a 
20% threshold for departures from represented conditions when he rules that the 21% drop in over-
all valuation constitutes an MAE.  I disagree that Laster was trying to establish an exact benchmark. 
He clearly states that the 40% threshold is not dispositive (see text accompanying note 191). Re-
garding the 20% indicator, he bases his analysis on several academic studies that point to 20% being 
used as a threshold in non-merger situations, including the threshold at which a drop in stock prices 
becomes a bear market. 2018 WL 4719347, at *75 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018). He repeatedly uses the 
phrase “cross-check” to hammer home the point that he is using these studies and indicators to con-
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2.  Purpose
The second frontier at which MAC clauses and the frustration doctrine in-
teract is purpose. The frustration doctrine only applies in situations where a par-
ty’s principal purpose in entering a transaction has been frustrated. Thus, it fol-
lows that MAC clauses should be read as altering this default rule. However, 
“the leading MAC case law holds that the clause can be triggered only when the 
principal purpose of a corporate acquirer—to purchase a profitable business as 
part of a long-term corporate strategy—is thwarted.”197
Before Akorn, Schwartz noted that the then-recent Hexion case provided 
hope that factors beyond the principal purpose could be considered.198 The 
Hexion court hinted that the courts could consider a purpose other than the usual 
one (“purchasing the target as part of a long-term strategy”) if “evidence to the 
contrary” was presented.199 Of the four elements of frustration that Schwartz 
identified, this is the element that Akorn does not address explicitly. However, 
there are several paragraphs dedicated to whether the synergistic value created 
by the deal can be considered when evaluating the magnitude of the change in 
value.200 Laster concludes that Akorn should only be evaluated as a standalone 
company, but crucially hints that might not have been the case if the definition 
had explicitly mentioned the combined company.201 While this doesn’t specifi-
cally address secondary purposes as the basis for a MAC claim, it does show
that courts will at the very least consider any purposes that are explicitly listed 
in the merger agreement, rather than uniformly evaluating every MAC claim by 
the effect on the long-term profit potential of the target corporation.
firm his intuition that Fresenius would consider the breaches material.  Id.  This kind of logic rein-
forces that he’s making the correct decision in this case, but isn’t trying to create a 20% threshold 
for all future breaches of representations. That being said, I don’t entirely dismiss Slack and Glass-
er’s analysis. If a future Chancery Court decision comes to a similar conclusion, then it would be 
reasonable for practitioners to assume that 20% is the standard for breaches in representation.  As 
Slack and Glasser put it: “Litigants . . . will have to explain why they believe that Vice Chancellor 
Laster’s quasi-bright-line of 20 percent is off.  Future cases will likely test whether an over-20 per-
cent valuation hit automatically counts as quantitatively significant.” Slack & Glasser, supra note 
12, at 38–39. So far, we have had an indication that Laster’s decision will be cited favorably, as 
seen Dermatology Assocs. of San Antonio v. Oliver St. Dermatology Mgmt. LLC, No. CV 2017-
0665-KSJM, 2020 WL 4581674, at *27 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2020). In that decision, the court favora-
bly cited to Akorn in ruling that the departure of several important physicians from a group, which 
led to an 11% decline in total revenue, was a material change in line with past decisions. Id.
197. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 830.
198. Id. at 832.
199. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008).
200. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *56.
201. Id. (“In my view, the plain language of the definition of [a MAC] makes clear that any 
[MAC] must be evaluated on a standalone basis . . . . If the parties had contemplated a synergistic 
approach, the definition would have referred to the surviving corporation or the combined compa-
ny.”).
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3.  Risk Allocation
Next, Schwartz argues that MAC clauses alter the default risk allocation 
that exists under the frustration doctrine.202 In the event of purpose being frus-
trated by an event out of both parties’ control, the frustration doctrine allows the 
party asserting it to place the risk of those events on the other party.203 In ac-
quisitions, this means that frustration places the risk of these exogenous events 
on the seller, since it is the buyer that asserts frustration in the case of frustrated 
purpose.204 As the standard clause analog to frustration, MAC clauses allow 
parties to shift the risk of exogenous events from the seller back to the buyer by 
allowing the parties to carve out certain events (such as changes in GAAP prac-
tices or general economic conditions) and prevent those events from being used 
to cancel the deal.205 The idea that MAC clauses allocate risk away from the 
seller using carve-outs was not a novel idea when Schwartz wrote his article,206
but Akorn repeated it once again, stating “the typical [MAC] clause allocates 
general market or industry risk to the buyer and company-specific risks to the 
seller . . . (which it accomplishes by) placing the general risk of [a MAC] on the 
seller, then using exception to reallocate specific categories of risk to the buy-
er.”207 On its own, this quote is simply restating something already known by 
the practitioners who write these agreements, but Laster’s explicit adoption of 
Schwartz’s wording and theory is another step towards showing his adoption of 
Schwartz’s general theory of MAC interpretation.
4.  Foreseeability
Finally, the frustration doctrine requires that “only unforeseeable risks can 
provide grounds for excuse,” since if parties meant to exclude specific risks, 
they would have contracted around them.208 Again, the very existence of a 
MAC clause (combined with softening sentiment toward the frustration re-
quirement of unforeseeability)209 should signal the intent of the parties to allow 
for foreseeable risks.210 Despite this, the IBP court seemed to endorse the un-
foreseeability requirement, stating that the MAC clause should be viewed as a 
202. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 832.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 832–33.
206. See generally Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 22 (describing in detail how carve-outs and 
exception allocate risk between buyer and sellers).
207. Akorn Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *49 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018). The article also directly quotes Schwartz on the matter, saying “[T]he risk of a 
target MAC resulting from a carved-out clause is allocated to the acquirer, while the risk of a target 
MAC resulting from any other cause is allocated to the target.” Id. at n. 532 (quoting Schwartz, su-
pra note 5, at 822).
208. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 833.
209. See id. At 809-10.
210. See id. at 834.
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“backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown events.”211
Schwartz views this as foolish for a number of reasons.212 First, MAC clauses 
do not mention foreseeability, even though they have other language specifying 
what types of changes do qualify.213 Second, most events that qualify under a 
MAC clause (like management shortcomings) are foreseeable by the nature of 
businesses.214
By ruling that a MAC had occurred, the Akorn decision implicitly and ex-
plicitly endorses both of these points.215 First, the court directly says that “the 
parties could have defined [a MAC] as including only unforeseeable effects, 
changes, events, or occurrences. They did none of these things.”216 This part of 
the decision even cites to Schwartz.217 Second, while the factors leading the 
MAC in Akorn were “unexpected,”218 they certainly were not unforeseeable.
Schwartz said that in a situation such as this one, “a huge dropoff in profits due 
to gross mismanagement” is “quite foreseeable,” a proposition that any follower 
of the news would likely find unsurprising.219 Thus, by finding a MAC had oc-
curred, Vice Chancellor Laster endorsed Schwartz’s contention that foreseeabil-
ity is not a requirement of MAC clauses.220
C. Now What? Renegotiations Swing Even Further in Buyers’ Favor
What does this all mean for the future of mergers and acquisitions law?
There are three primary possible outcomes.
First, Schwartz’s theory could have been incorrect or at least flawed, leav-
ing any conclusions from it irrelevant. While his logic seems sound, one poten-
tial hole in his argument was pointed out in an article by Professor Judd F. 
211. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001) (emphasis added). 
212. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 834.
213. Id.
214. Id.  Schwartz also argues that “an unforeseeability requirement would come close to 
reading the MAC clause out of existence because, in the cosmic sense, everything is foreseeable.”
Id.
215. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *61.
216. Id.
217. Id. at n. 629 (“[S]see also [Schwartz] (providing additional arguments why [MAC] pro-
visions should not be interpreted to contain an implied foreseeability term).”).
218. Id. at *61 (“[T]he evidence shows that the events that resulted in a General MAE at 
Akorn were unexpected.”).
219. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 834.
220. See Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *61. The opinion also states that “assuming for the 
sake of argument that Akorn was correct and Fresenius had foreseen [the events], I do not believe 
that would change the result given the allocation of risk under the definition of a [MAC] set forth in 
the Merger Agreement.” Id. While this seems like the golden quote that clearly supports Schwartz, 
the reference to the specific Akorn and Fresenius merger agreement seems to diminish its broad 
applicability. That being said, there is nothing out of the ordinary about the terms of that merger 
agreement and thus one would be forgiven for thinking this quote puts the foreseeable/unforeseeable 
debate to rest for good. 
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Sneirson, who argued that reading contract law principles into merger agree-
ments can be inappropriate because merger agreements should be guided by 
corporate law principles in addition to contract law principles.221 Many princi-
ples of contract law are guided by the simple premise of two parties coming to 
an agreement, but the reality of corporate environments is that deals involve 
many fiduciaries acting on behalf of the entity they represent who must be re-
sponsive to the accompanying fiduciary duties they owe.222 This conflict has 
left courts juggling a variety of frameworks to view deal protection methods 
through, and Delaware courts have seemed to flip-flop between several different 
approaches.223 While Sneirson ultimately endorses contract law principles, his 
analysis could shed light on a crucial flaw in Schwartz’s theory: If contract law 
cannot be strictly followed in corporate law cases, then perhaps the Chancery 
Court’s decision to ignore some of its basic principles in previous MAC cases 
can be forgiven. Other scholars, however, have weighed in in favor of contract 
law supremacy, with one even specifically addressing the IBP ruling and posit-
ing that subordinating contract values to corporate principles in mergers is “un-
necessary and improperly devalues contract doctrine.”224 Following Sneirson’s 
concluding sentence, where he suggests “corporate law should recognize and 
consider contract . . . and incorporate, where appropriate, useful lessons from 
these other areas of [contract] law,” I think that Schwartz’s analysis still holds 
up.225 But perhaps future courts may disagree.226
A second, more likely possibility is that Schwartz’s analysis was correct, 
but that courts will determine that Vice Chancellor Laster’s Akorn opinion did 
not generally adopt Schwartz’s theory, but instead cherry-picked several parts 
of it to solidify his point in a case that had uniquely egregious facts. I will dis-
cuss what this looks like in the following section.
221. See generally Judd F. Sneirson, Merger Agreements, Termination Fees, and the Con-
tract-Corporate Tension, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 573 (2002). It is important to note that this 
article is not a direct response to Schwartz (it came out three years earlier). While it concerns termi-
nation fees, rather than MACs, the shared status of both types of clauses as deal protection devices 
makes the analysis sufficiently relevant.
222. See id. at 574.
223. See id. at 606–07. Delaware courts suggested contract law supremacy in Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), corporate law supremacy in Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. QVC Networks, Inc. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994), and then suggested a four-factor balancing test in 
ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999). See id at 606–08. 
224. Celia R. Taylor, When Good Mergers Go Bad: Controlling Corporate Managers Who 
Suffer a Change of Heart, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 577, 580–81 (2003).  Ironically, Taylor’s endorse-
ment of contract law led her to a different conclusion than Schwartz, characterizing IBP as “an im-
portant example of an appropriately balanced approach.” See id.  Of course, Schwartz’s specific 
quarrel with IBP was not whether VC Strine applied contract law, but how he did so. See Schwartz, 
supra note 5, at 826-27 (citing IBP as the first in a line of several decisions that created a materiality 
standard without regard for preexisting case law interpreting materiality in contracts).
225. Sneirson, supra note 221, at 629. 
226. Given that Schwartz’s article was published in a prominent law review and doesn’t ap-
pear to have been meaningfully critiqued by any other scholars in the decade since it was published, 
I would lean towards his theory being generally accepted by other scholars, if not yet by courts. 
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The third possibility is that Laster’s opinion will give courts the ammunition 
they need to reverse the trend of seller-friendly rulings and finally give the text 
of merger agreements the meaning it was intended to have (and deserves).
In the final section of his article, Schwartz gives an example of what this 
could look like in practice.227 In late 2008, financial giants Bank of America 
and Merrill Lynch agreed to a $50 billion acquisition agreement that would 
have created the largest bank in the country.228 Before closing, the financial 
crisis had set in, and Merrill posted a staggering $15 billion loss in the fourth 
quarter of that year alone.229 Despite this astonishing number, Bank of America 
closed the deal on New Year’s Day 2009.230 Schwartz argues that it seemed 
like they had no choice.231 After all, there still had not been a successful MAC 
claim in Delaware by that time.232 The primary issue was that even though 
Merrill Lynch had lost an astounding $15 billion, the parties may have believed 
that such a short-term loss was meaningless based on the existing precedent.233
And they likely would have been right.234 This was a clear example of a com-
pany making a decision that it likely would not have if courts correctly inter-
preted MAC clauses as a standard clause analog to the frustration doctrine.235
D. Finally, a Sign? Channel Medsystems v. Boston Scientific
In the immediate aftermath of Akorn, there were no important indications of 
how future courts would apply Vice Chancellor Laster’s reasoning.236 That 
227. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 835–38.
228. Id. at 835.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See id at 835–36. In the end, the decision not to sue and claim a MAC was made by the 
government as much as Bank of America. Id. at 836.  Fearing that financial chaos would ensue if a 
MAC was asserted, the Treasury Secretary threatened to replace the bank’s directors and then se-
cretly offered $20 billion in taxpayer financing.  Id.  However, regardless of the external pressure, 
the entire situation was informed by the existing court precedent, and thus the analysis is still rele-
vant (if less convincing). See id. at 835–36.  For more details on the government intervention, see 
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?: Joint 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform and the Subcomm. on Domestic 
Po’ly, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter “Hearings”].
232. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 837.
233. Id. Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve stated in the subsequent 
hearings that the leading precedent held that “short-term losses, no matter how large” could not 
qualify as a MAC. See id. at 837 & n.280 (quoting Hearings, supra note 231). 
234. See id. (calling Chairman Bernanke’s statement “correct”).
235. Although in this case, this result could have led to serious further damage to the financial 
system. See id. at 838 (“The government felt strongly that if Bank of America invoked the MAC 
clause, it could have seriously damaged the then-fragile financial system.”).
236. My research indicates that none of the ten occasions on which Akorn was cited in opin-
ions before December 2019 were related to MACs. See, e.g., Himawan v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2018-
0075-SG, 2018 WL 6822708, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2018) (citing Akorn as a source for various 
standards of “efforts” clauses).
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changed in late December 2019, when the Chancery Court weighed in on the 
potential termination of a deal between two medical technology companies.237
In the decision, Chancellor Bouchard ruled that no MAC had occurred, a deci-
sion that some felt was proof that Akorn was simply a one-off case, not a “wa-
tershed moment that would make such findings more common.”238 But examin-
ing the text of Bouchard’s opinion leads to no such conclusion. In fact, 
Bouchard’s reasoning remains consistent with Laster’s, with perhaps the only 
salient difference being a set of facts that even Schwartz would likely agree do 
not represent a MAC.
In 2017, Boston Scientific entered into an agreement with Channel Medsys-
tems, of which Boston was already a minority owner, to purchase the remaining 
outstanding equity of the company for $275 million.239 The agreement was 
conditioned on FDA approval of Cerene, Channel’s only product, and would
close following FDA approval.240 Less than two months after signing the 
agreement, Channel discovered that its Vice President of Quality, Dinesh Shan-
kar, had used falsified documents to pilfer approximately $2.6 million from the 
company.241 After discovering this, Channel immediately took action, notifying 
Boston Scientific of the fraud, hiring a forensic accounting firm to determine 
the extent of Shankar’s misdeeds, and filing a remediation plan with the FDA 
(who accepted the plan and indicated that Shankar’s fraud would not affect the 
approval of Cerene).242 Despite this assurance from the FDA, Boston an-
nounced its intent to terminate the merger agreement in May 2018, alleging that 
Shankar’s misconduct led to an uncurable breach of the agreement.243 In March 
of 2019, the FDA approved Cerene, a timeline consistent with what the parties 
expected at the time the agreement was made and six months before the con-
tractual deadline for such approval, thus effectively eliminating what would 
have been the primary grounds for a MAC.244 In his ruling, Chancellor Bou-
237. See Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 WL 
6896462, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
238. Jason M. Halper et al., The Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects Termination of Merger 
Agreement Based on Material Adverse Effect, NAT’L. L. REV. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/delaware-court-chancery-rejects-termination-merger-agreement-based-material-
adverse; see also Amy L. Simmerman et al., Delaware Court of Chancery Declines to Find Materi-
al Adverse Effect and Orders Specific Performance of a Merger, WILSON SONSINI  (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/delaware-court-of-chancery-declines-to-find-a-material-adverse-
effect-and-orders-specific-performance-of-a-merger.html (“[T]he new decision, consistent with pri-
or case law, reflects that buyers claiming [a MAC] face a heavy burden and that Akorn was not a 
turning point in Delaware law.”).
239. Boston Sci. Corp., 2019 WL 6896462, at *5.
240. Id. at *4.
241. See id. at *1. Shankar pled guilty for fraud and is now in prison. He has since repaid al-
most the entirety of the $2.57 million.  Id. at *7.
242. See id. at *6–12. 
243. See id. at *13.
244. See id. at *14 (“[Boston Scientific’s quality expert] confirmed that the FDA’s approval 
necessarily reflects its conclusion that Cerene is safe and effective . . . and that its clinical data is 
272 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 10:241
chard ruled that no MAC had occurred and ordered specific performance of the 
agreement.245
At first glance, this decision runs counter to Akorn, making it clear that at 
the very least, Akorn did not pave the way for years of courts siding with buyers 
and counterbalancing the previous two decades. But closer examination reveals 
that Bouchard’s opinion positively cites to Akorn in several places without ever 
calling into question Vice Chancellor Laster’s reasoning. In addition, the opin-
ion is overall at least partially consistent with the Schwartz analytical frame-
work, even though the flagrant facts of the case force a different result.
Channel argued that the fact that Shankar falsified only six test reports (out 
of 138 submitted to the FDA)246 could not possibly be considered material, es-
pecially since they had no impact on the FDA’s decision.247 Bouchard disa-
greed, stating that “[d]epending on the circumstances, a single test report gener-
ated from falsified content may be significant enough to establish material 
noncompliance.”248 This lower threshold of materiality is reminiscent of Akorn,
with Bouchard even drawing a large block quote from Laster’s opinion and in-
cluding Laster’s observation that a MAC can occur “without the effect on the 
target’s business being felt yet.”249
Bouchard made sure to emphasize that his ultimate decision was impacted 
by “a lack of good faith” on the part of Boston Scientific, “corroborated by con-
temporaneous evidence that [the company] was looking for a way out of its deal 
with Channel due to growing concerns that Cerene would be difficult to market 
and the proposed transaction was complicating a potential divestment of part of 
Boston Scientific’s business.”250 Bouchard appeared to believe that Boston 
Scientific’s position (that Shankar’s fraud would necessitate starting from 
scratch) was “not objectively reasonable” given the FDA’s indication that prod-
uct approval would not be affected.251 Additionally, Boston Scientific switched
from that position just a few weeks before trial (when the FDA gave final ap-
proval) to a focus on the need for retesting of the product, a self-serving mallea-
bility that Bouchard felt made their new argument “not credible.”252 The em-
phasis on corrupt motive as the precipitating factor is reminiscent of Vice 
reliable, describing FDA approval as ‘the proof in the pudding’. [T]his meant that the FDA ‘had all 
of the information [it] needed to make an informed decision’ when approving Cerene. Due to the 
FDA’s approval, Channel can market Cerene in the Unites States immediately.”).
245. See id. at *1.
246. Id. at *6.
247. See id. at *21.
248. Id.
249. Id. at * 25 (citing Akron, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 
4719347, at *46 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018)).
250. Id. at *38 (citing Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 755-
56 (Del. Ch. 2008)).
251. Id. at *31. 
252. Id. at *29.
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Chancellor Strine’s IBP reasoning.253 But part of the reason that IBP was as-
cribed such doctrinal significance since was that at the time it marked the most 
in-depth Delaware interpretation of a MAC clause. Now that this field has been 
flushed out more thoroughly over the past two decades, future courts should 
recognize Boston Scientific for what it is—a clear case of pretextual reasoning 
by a self-serving party to escape a bad deal, not an example of a MAC.
For a proponent of Akorn’s relaxed MAC standard, Boston Scientific is not
the ideal subsequent case. But it is important to recognize that even though the 
two opinions reach different decisions, the court had little choice but to reject 
the MAC claim given that the FDA’s approval of Cerene negated the main 
premise on which the claim was based. The court even separately found that 
Boston had breached its own responsibility to use commercially reasonable ef-
forts to close the deal, a circumstance that left little room for finding that a 
MAC had occurred.254 Despite the case coming to a different result than Akorn,
the chief takeaway is that Chancellor Bouchard’s opinion adopts much of 
Akorn’s reasoning without expressing any disagreement, which, if anything, 
proves that Laster’s opinion will likely be cited in many more future decisions.
While Boston Scientific may not be a ringing endorsement of Akorn’s message, 
the two opinions share reasoning that is entirely consistent. Boston Scientific is 
simply an example of a court with no other option given the egregious facts at 
hand, and it certainly does not preclude future courts from using Akorn as the 
future standard for the next generation of MAC cases, paving the way for a 
more relaxed (and correct) interpretation of contract law.
E. What’s Next? COVID-19 is Giving Courts Opportunities to 
Test Akorn
In November 2019, the first known case of the novel coronavirus (COVID-
19) was discovered.255 Within months, the respiratory virus had inspired a 
worldwide panic.256 What started as a localized health concern became a pan-
demic, infecting over 140 million people and leading to more than three million 
deaths at the time of this Article.257 Reacting to potential chaos and the effects 
of restrictive measures imposed by both individuals and governments across the 
world, financial markets fell into freefall.258 On March 12, 2020, the day after 
253. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
254. Boston Sci. Corp., 2019 WL 6896462, at *1.
255. Josephine Ma, Coronavirus: China’s First Confirmed Covid-19 Case Traced Back to 
November 17, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 14, 2020, 12:45 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news
/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back.
256. See Coronavirus: World in ‘Uncharted Territory’ BBC (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-51712437.
257. See Coronavirus World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 2021, 
12:12 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-maps.html.
258. See Travel Limits, Economic Fears Stoke Market Plunge, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/business/stock-market-today.html.
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the World Health Organization had officially categorized the disease as a pan-
demic,259 the Dow Jones dropped by 10%, the largest such drop since 1987.260
As the world ramped up its efforts to stop the spread of the virus, businesses 
faced an uncertain future.261 The mergers and acquisitions community braced 
for impact, with many prominent law firms publishing predictive guides for cli-
ents and attorneys, many of which focused on the MAC as an area to watch.262
Two major impacts on MACs were expected. First, an increase in the number 
of companies invoking the MAC clause, forcing courts to confront Akorn’s im-
pact, was expected.263 Second, a change in MAC clauses themselves was ex-
pected, as dealmakers bargained over whether to include COVID-19 (and gen-
eral pandemic) related exceptions.264
During the financial crisis of the late 2000s, there was a strong decline in 
merger and acquisition activity.265 But while there was a short-term decline in 
merger activity at the outset of the pandemic, deal-making quickly rebounded, 
with an estimated 17-20% increase in merger activity in the second half of 2020 
over the first half.266 However, the beginning of the pandemic saw major deals 
broken as economic uncertainty joined forces with financing concerns, travel 
restrictions, due diligence complications, and supply chain disruptions to leave 
buyers uncertain of how to evaluate their prospective targets.267
259. See Coronavirus Confirmed as Pandemic by World Health Organization, BBC (Mar. 11, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51839944.
260. Travel Limits, Economic Fears Stoke Market Plunge, supra note 258.
261. See id.
262. See James Anderson et al., Coronavirus/COVID-19: Implications for Commercial and 
Financial Contracts, SKADDEN, ARPS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights
/publications/2020/02/coronavirus-covid19-implications; see also, Marcia Ellis et al., The Impact of 
the COVID-19 Outbreak on PE Investors and their Portfolio Companies in Asia – Part 1,
MORRISON FOERSTER (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200220-covid-19-
pe-investors-portfolio-companies-asia-part-1.html; see also Scott A. Barshay et al., Is the Corona-
virus a Material Adverse Effect?, PAUL WEISS (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com
/practices/transactional/mergers-acquisitions/publications/is-the-coronavirus-a-material-adverse-
effect?id=30800.
263. See Barshay, et al, supra note 262.
264. See Caroline Blitzer Phillips, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Does the COVID-19 Outbreak Con-
stitute a Material Adverse Effect? Plus Other Impacts on M&A Transactions, JD SUPRA (Mar. 13, 
2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/does-the-covid-19-outbreak-constitute-a-85203/.  Other 
representations and warranties will be affected as well. We will likely see more negotiation regard-
ing the “ordinary course of business” covenant (which Akorn also addressed) as well as an increase 
in representations and warranties insurance (which will likely be tweaked to avoid many of the 
known risks of COVID-19). See id.
265. See JEFF GELL ET AL., THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, ACCELERATING OUT OF THE 
GREAT RECESSION 7 (June 2010), https://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG_Accelerating_Out_of_
the_Great_Recession_M_and_A_Jul_10_tcm108-117898.pdf (estimating that total merger value 
was almost cut in half between 2008 and 2009).
266. Global M&A Industry Trends, PWC (Apr. 21, 2021, 12:34 PM), 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/deals/trends.html.
267. See Benjamin Horney, 7 Major M&A Deals That Broke Down Due to COVID-19, 
LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2021, 8:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1342476/7-major-m-a-deals-
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Further complicating the broken deals was uncertainty over whether or not 
the exceptions already present in most agreements would cover COVID-19. A
study conducted by Harvard Law School professor John Coates found that 
while only 33% of large merger agreements in the year before the pandemic 
used MAC definitions that excluded “pandemics, epidemics, public health cri-
ses, or influenzas,” 87% contained exclusions for “natural disasters, crises, or 
calamities.”268 In a late-2020 decision, the Chancery Court hinted that it would 
allow this second, broader, and more prevalent definition to encompass COVID 
related MAC claims, ruling that such language was sufficient to preclude a 
MAC claim in a $5.8 billion hotel deal between a Chinese insurance company 
and Korean financial services conglomerate.269 Akorn itself, interestingly 
enough, was an example of a deal that would likely except the pandemic from 
its MAC definition. Unlike, IBP, which lacked many exceptions,270 Akorn’s 
agreement had a long list of potential occurrences that were specially exempted 
from the MAC clause.271 Specifically, it exempted anything “resulting from or 
attributable to . . . pandemics . . . , force majeure events or other comparable 
events.”272 In light of the WHO’s decision to officially deem the virus a pan-
demic, it seems clear the effects of COVID would be excepted under this type 
of language.
Thus, it appears that COVID itself will not be a major instigator for a new 
spate of illuminating MAC litigation. As the world adapts to the post-COVID 
era, it appears negotiators will negotiate exclusions that will leave no doubt in 
the minds of the courts that they intend to exclude the virus. Morgan Stanley’s 
$14.5 billion acquisition of E*Trade (the largest Wall Street acquisition since 
the last financial crisis) has already provided an example of what a more specif-
ic clause might look like.273 The merger agreement excluded any “epidemic, 
that-broke-down-due-to-covid-19 (summarizing seven large deals that were called off either due to 
or concurrently with the beginning of the pandemic); see also Ann Marie Uetz, et al., Managing the 
Commercial Impact of the Coronavirus: Impacts on the Corporate & Securities Landscape, Includ-
ing M&A and Public Company Reporting Considerations, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: INSIGHTS (Mar. 
13, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/03/coronavirus-corporate-
securities-ma-reporting (outlining the kind of disruptions that were expected by dealmakers at the 
start of the pandemic); see also Richard Harroch et al, The Impact of the Coronavirus Crisis on 
Mergers and Acquisitions, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness
/2020/04/17/impact-of-coronavirus-crisis-on-mergers-and-acquisitions/?sh=6796a842200a (explain-
ing that concerns such as due diligence complications and financing uncertainty slowed down deal-
making at the outset of the pandemic).
268. AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels & Resorts One LLC, C.A. No.  2020-0310-JTL, 
2020 WL 7024929, at *63-64 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020).
269. See id. at *57–59.
270. See Agreement, supra note 68.
271. See Akorn, Inc., Current Report, Exhibit 2.1 (Form 8-K) (Apr. 24, 2017).
272. Id. at § 8.12 (defining “Material Adverse Effect”).
273. See Analysis: Morgan Stanley, E*Trade Merger Excludes Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG 
LAW (Feb. 20, 2020, 3:25 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-
morgan-stanley-e-trade-merger-excludes-coronavirus.
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pandemic or disease outbreak (including the COVID-19 virus)” that would rea-
sonably be expected to result in a MAC.274 Similar to how companies began to 
increase exceptions for acts of terrorism in the wake of 9/11, it would be sur-
prising if all other deals in the near future do not include similar language, par-
ticularly as companies factor in the expected impact of the virus into the initial 
deal price.275 Besides the AB Stable hotel deal, there have been very few other 
broken deals that have resulted in Chancery Court decisions, and anticipated 
major litigation frequently does not make it to trial.276 One case to keep an eye 
on is Agspring v. NGP, which favorably cited to Akorn’s relaxed standard at the 
pleadings phase, but does not appear to have reached any further stage yet.277
But even though COVID does not appear to be directly instigating substan-
tially more MAC litigation, the economic uncertainty it may bring to the world 
over the next few years still could be a source of future litigation. Much of the 
pandemic’s effects cannot be known in the very short-term, but regardless of 
what the fallout ends up being, the broken mergers of 2020 and the possibility 
of future economic uncertainty could force courts to take a more definitive 
stand on MAC clauses. As explained above, they would be correct to choose 
Akorn as their guide for doing so.
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in exceptions to the definition of [a MAC], just as terrorism exceptions became more commonplace 
following the events of September 11, 2001.”).
276. Katelyn Crawford et al., FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, DE Court of Chancery Weighs Termi-
nating M&A Deals Under Material Adverse Effect Clauses, JD SUPRA (May 8, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/de-court-of-chancery-weighs-terminating-21410/ (detailing 
four recent MAC claims and the grounds for each, most notably in the purchase of L Brands (Victo-
ria’s Secret) by Sycamore Partners). Three of the claims were settled in some form, and the other 
appears to still be pending.  Carleton English, L Brands, Sycamore Partners Reach Mutual Agree-
ment’ Terminating Sale of Victoria’s Secret, BARRONS (May 4, 2020, 5:22 PM), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/l-brands-sycamore-partners-abandon-victorias-secret-deal-
51588627374; Gillian Tan, SoftBank Commits $1 Billion to WeWork Amid Membership Drop,
BLOOMBERG https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-13/softbank-injects-1-1-billion-
into-wework-as-membership-drops (Aug. 12, 2020 8:17 PM); Rich Duprey, Bed Bath & Beyond 
Settles Lawsuit With 1-800-Flowers, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jul. 22, 2020, 1:08 PM), 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/07/22/bed-bath-beyond-settles-lawsuit-with-1-800-
flowers.aspx; Rose Krebs, Yoga Studio Chain Can’t Nix Suit Over Frozen Purchase Deal, Law360 
(Aug. 19, 2021, 6:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1302554/yoga-studio-chain-can-t-nix-
suit-over-frozen-purchase-deal
277. See Agspring Holdco, LLC v. NGP X US Holdings, L.P., C.A. No. 2019-0567-AGB, 
2020 WL 4355555, at *17 & n.162 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2020) (citing Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi 
AG, 2018 WL 4719347, at *53 and Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., 1990 WL 193326, at *5 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990) to support that 47% reduction in forecasted EBITDA was sufficient to sup-
port an MAE claim at the pleadings stage). 
Spring 2021] Rethinking Mac Clauses 277
CONCLUSION
Courts have spent most of last twenty years dismissing even the most justi-
fied of MAC claims; and, in doing so, have violated the most basic principles of 
contract law. The Delaware Chancery Court’s 2018 decision in Akorn, finding 
that a MAC had occurred, finally will give future courts the precedent they need 
to begin applying a more coherent (and correct) judicial philosophy. As we 
begin the decade faced with economic uncertainty brought on by COVID-19, 
courts could see an increase in MAC claims coming before them, giving them 
the opportunity to cement Akorn as the guiding precedent for the future of MAC 
jurisprudence.

